Two of the most consequential AI labs in the world decided, within the same week, that their newest cyber capabilities were too dangerous to release openly. The reason is concrete and unresolved: Anthropic's Mythos model found vulnerabilities in real software that remain almost entirely unpatched, and U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell called bank CEOs to brief them on the threat before the model had even been published broadly.
That is the pressure. The disclosure process that defenders rely on — find a bug, report it, fix it, disclose — cannot keep up with a model that finds bugs faster than humans can fix them. The backlog is not hypothetical. According to Anthropic's own reporting, over 99% of the vulnerabilities Mythos Preview identified remain unpatched as the company works through responsible disclosure.
The second fact: the two labs reached the same conclusion through separate decisions. Anthropic restricted its Mythos model to a closed program called Project Glasswing, available to roughly 40 organizations including Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, and JPMorgan Chase, PYMNTS reported. OpenAI followed with its own cyber-capable model, GPT-5.4-Cyber, via a tiered Trusted Access for Cyber program that is scaling to thousands of defenders but not pursuing public release. Two different commercial calculations, one shared judgment: the offense value of these models currently exceeds what open distribution can responsibly deliver.
The capability jump was not small. On a benchmark testing how often each model could turn identified vulnerabilities in Mozilla Firefox into working exploits, Anthropic's prior model succeeded roughly twice in several hundred attempts. Mythos Preview succeeded 181 times. Anthropic did not train these capabilities explicitly — they emerged as a downstream consequence of general improvements in code generation, reasoning, and autonomous problem-solving. That matters: the jump happened without a dedicated cyberweapons program. It arrived through the normal logic of making models better at code.
The Treasury and Fed meeting, reported by Security Boulevard, is the regulatory pressure point that makes this more than a product-access story. Bessent and Powell convened CEOs of most of the largest banks. The topic was systemic cyber risk from advanced AI capabilities. That is the financial system flagging that it has a problem it cannot yet solve, and that the vulnerability backlog is part of why.
The asymmetry is the core of the problem. When a model finds a vulnerability, the clock starts. Responsible disclosure means telling the vendor, waiting for a patch, then publishing, a process that can take months per vulnerability. Mythos Preview found so many, so fast, that Anthropic says it can currently discuss only a small fraction of them. The remainder are vulnerabilities that exist in shipped software, are known to at least one organization, and cannot yet be fixed. If an attacker independently discovers the same vulnerability, which is plausible given the Mythos Preview benchmark results, there is no patch and no disclosure. The window between discovery and remediation is the actual risk.
The tiered-access approach both labs chose is a bet that defenders with AI can outpace attackers with AI. OpenAI's Trusted Access for Cyber program has contributed to fixes on over 3,000 critical and high-severity vulnerabilities since launch. That is a meaningful number. It is also, notably, a smaller number than the vulnerabilities Anthropic has identified in a single model cycle.
Who is left out matters as much as who is in. Project Glasswing's 40 organizations are among the best-resourced security operations in the world. The companies without Glasswing access — mid-sized firms, critical infrastructure operators, sectors regulators have not yet summoned — face the same vulnerability backlog with no equivalent access to the discovery process. The bug bounty and penetration testing market, which relies on human researchers finding vulnerabilities one at a time, faces structural pressure when a single model run can identify more viable exploits than the entire industry produces in a year.
The question for the field is not whether AI will be used for cyber defense. Both labs are clearly committed to that. The question is whether the disclosure and patching infrastructure can be rebuilt fast enough to matter. The 99% backlog is the number to watch — and it is not getting smaller while the models improve.