The Pentagon committed $400 million to secure rare earth magnets it can no longer buy from China. The factory that money is building won't produce a single magnet until 2028. On January 1, 2027, a US defense law bans Chinese-origin rare earth materials from American weapons systems. That eight-month gap is the story that a new Sprott investment fund — the Rare Earths Ex-China ETF, trading as REXC on Nasdaq — launched last week to track.
REXC is the first stock-market fund built exclusively on non-Chinese rare earth companies: miners, processors, and magnet manufacturers outside China. Rare earths are 17 metals whose magnetic properties are irreplaceable in high-performance permanent magnets — the kind used in fighter jet engines, missile guidance systems, and drone motors. According to Sprott, the fund launched April 14 with $5.47 million in assets and 34 holdings. The fund's largest holding is MP Materials, the company that received the Pentagon's $400 million and is building the magnet factory in question.
China controls more than 90 percent of global rare earth processing, separation capacity, and magnet manufacturing. It introduced export licensing for gallium and germanium, elements used in semiconductors and optical systems, in 2025, then extended those controls to neodymium, dysprosium, and terbium in 2026. Those three are the building blocks of the magnets. The October 2025 controls were suspended until November 10, 2026.
The US response was to fund the only domestic alternative. The Defense Department took a $400 million equity stake in MP Materials, the operator of Mountain Pass in California, the only commercial-scale rare earth mine in the United States, and guaranteed a minimum price of $110 per kilogram for neodymium-praseodymium oxide for 10 years. MP Materials is building a magnet manufacturing campus in Northlake, Texas, called 10X. The plant is designed to produce roughly 7,000 metric tons of rare earth magnets annually, and all of that output is committed to the Pentagon under the terms of the deal. Production begins in 2028.
The rule banning Chinese rare earths is DFARS § 225.7018, updated defense procurement rules that take effect January 1, 2027. The 10X plant goes online in 2028. The Pentagon funded the solution and the solution is late.
REXC's top two holdings are MP Materials at 20.63 percent and Lynas Rare Earths of Australia at 19.84 percent, together roughly 40 percent of the fund. Lynas is building a heavy rare earth separation facility in Seadrift, Texas, also with Pentagon support. USA Rare Earth, NioCorp, and Iluka round out the next tier. The index these stocks feed tracks $48.8 billion in total market cap. The $5.47 million in assets is not, by itself, a meaningful market signal. What it represents: a financial instrument now exists to track companies attempting to solve a supply chain that will not be at scale before the compliance deadline.
The critical bottleneck is not mining. There are rare earth deposits outside China. The bottleneck is processing and metallization: the steps that convert extracted ore into the purified oxides, metals, and alloys that magnets require. China built that industrial ecosystem over decades. As OilPrice reported, REalloys is running metallization out of Euclid, Ohio, with Phase 1 targeting roughly 400 tonnes per year of neodymium-praseodymium metal, expanding to approximately 2,700 tonnes in Phase 2. The Saskatchewan Research Council is targeting separated oxide production by late 2026 or early 2027. Those are real projects with real timelines. Whether they can cover the compliance window before 10X comes online is a question the calendar will answer, not press releases.
The DFARS ban may cover only newly procured systems rather than existing inventory, which would mean the Pentagon could continue drawing down stockpiles through the transition without triggering a crisis. If that interpretation holds, the compliance urgency is real but the supply gap is manageable. If the ban applies to materials in the supply chain regardless of end-use system status, the gap is structural and the Pentagon has a problem it is spending $400 million and four years trying to solve.
REXC is a small fund with a large premise: that the next decade's most strategically important supply chain is being built right now, outside China, and that the market can fund what policy has made urgent. The policy is real. The deadline is real. The production timeline is the open question.