China Leads Global Surge in Counter-Drone Patents as Security Concerns Grow

In the year ending March 31, 2025, researchers and engineers around the world filed 126 patent applications for technologies designed to detect, disrupt, or destroy drones. China accounted for 82 of them. The United States, the world’s dominant military power, filed 22. South Korea, a distant third, filed 6.

The numbers come from Mathys & Squire, a 115-year-old UK intellectual property law firm that tracks filing trends across global patent offices, and were reported this week by DRONELIFE and corroborated by the South China Morning Post. They represent a 27 percent jump from the prior year’s 99 applications and trace a clear strategic pattern: as cheap commercial drones have transformed modern warfare — most visibly in Ukraine, where quadcopters guide artillery and drop munitions — the race to kill them has accelerated sharply.

“Drones have shifted from being a niche concern to a mainstream security challenge, and the rise in patent filings reflects that change,” said Andrew White, a partner at Mathys & Squire, in a statement accompanying the firm’s March 2026 report. “Laser and microwave systems are gaining traction in the counter-drone market, and this is likely just the beginning of a broader shift in how airspace threats are countered.”

The technology split in the filing data tells its own story. Signal jamming led with 49 patents — methods for severing the link between a drone and its operator, or corrupting the GPS signals it navigates by. Laser-based systems accounted for 39 patents, using focused light to physically damage a drone’s components or structure. Microwave systems — high-power electromagnetic pulses designed to fry a drone’s electronics at range — drew 24 filings. The common thread: all three represent a shift away from kinetic interceptors, the missile-and-rifle approach that predates the commercial drone era. Shooting a $400 quadcopter out of the sky with a $100,000 Patriot missile has never penciled out. Directed energy does.

The Ukraine effect is visible in the data. Drone-first warfare demonstrated at scale that small, cheap, expendable aircraft could accomplish tasks that once required manned aircraft or precision-guided munitions — and at a fraction of the cost. Both sides in the conflict have lost aircraft by the thousands. The lesson landed in defense ministries from Washington to Warsaw to Riyadh. The patent numbers are the paper trail of that reckoning.

China’s lead is not merely numerical. Beijing has been explicit about counter-drone capabilities as a national security priority, weaving them into its civil-military fusion framework that funnels commercial technology into defense programs. Chinese research institutions and state-linked companies file aggressively and early, a pattern seen in other strategic technology races. The Mathys & Squire data offers no breakdown by individual assignee — the Chinese filings could come from a dozen institutions or two, and the identity of the most active players remains opaque — but the volume itself is a signal.

What it means for the United States is the harder question.

The patent data captures research, not deployed capability. Counter-drone technology is one of those fields where filing a patent and fielding a working system are separated by years of engineering, testing, and operational vetting. The United States leads in several areas the filing data doesn’t fully capture: AI-enabled threat classification, GPS spoofing countermeasures, and the integration of detection systems with layered response architectures. American companies like Dedrone, which makes airspace security systems for airports and government facilities, Anduril Industries, and DroneShield are active in commercial and government markets, particularly in the United States and allied countries.

That said, the patent gap matters for reasons beyond bragging rights. IP portfolios shape what companies can build, what they must license, and what legal exposure they carry into foreign markets. As China’s counter-drone IP accumulates faster than American, the structural pressure on Western competitors — around licensing, market access, and export control negotiation — is likely to grow. Whether that pressure rises to the level of a real commercial barrier remains to be seen. But the trajectory is not favorable.

The supply chain picture adds another layer. China’s dominance in the materials that underpin drone manufacturing — rare-earth magnets, aerospace-grade carbon fiber, gallium-nitride semiconductors — gives it leverage that patent counts don’t capture. A December 2025 CSIS analysis titled “The Drone Supply Chain War: Identifying the Chokepoints to Making a Drone” found that nearly every unmanned system in the Ukraine conflict, on both sides, contains materials or components originating in Chinese factories and refineries. The same analysis documented how China’s export controls on drone-related minerals and rare earths have demonstrated how easily those dependencies can be weaponized. China has also moved to restrict drone part exports to the United States, a tit-for-tat escalation in the broader technology war.

The United States is responding, though the response is uneven. The U.S. Army’s announcement last week of a $52 million order for more than 2,500 Skydio X10D drones — the largest single-vendor tactical small unmanned aircraft system procurement in Army history, awarded in under 72 hours — reflects both the scale of demand and the Pentagon’s preference for domestic suppliers. Every Skydio X10D is manufactured at the company’s facility in Hayward, California. Skydio is already on the Blue UAS Cleared List, the Defense Department’s registry of NDAA-compliant drones, and its X10D is designed to operate without GPS, using onboard cameras for terrain mapping in contested environments.

The broader policy environment is shifting. The Safer Skies Act, embedded in the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, expands counter-UAS authority beyond the handful of federal agencies that previously held it — the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice — to include trained and certified state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement. The FBI has launched the National Counter-UAS Training Center to prepare local agencies for that expanded authority, with the 2026 FIFA World Cup serving as a near-term operational test case. State and local officers who complete the training can then be authorized by the Department of Justice to conduct drone mitigation, a model that FedScoop reported in November 2025 as a deliberate effort to build distributed counter-UAS capacity ahead of major public events. The Pentagon’s counter-drone task force separately launched a marketplace where defense personnel can acquire anti-UAS technology, a signal that acquisition timelines are being compressed.

Anduril Industries, the defense technology company founded by Palmer Luckey, received a $20 billion Army contract in March with counter-drone capabilities as a stated priority. Whether Anduril’s approach — software-defined, AI-augmented, rapid iteration — can translate into fielded systems faster than traditional acquisition is one of the more consequential open questions in defense technology.

The patent numbers alone don’t answer that question. But they tell you where the investment is going — and where the next set of legal battles, export control fights, and arms-control negotiations will be centered. China’s 82 filings aren’t just a statistic. They’re a statement of intent about who gets to control the airspace above the 21st century’s battlefields.

Andrew White of Mathys & Squire put it plainly: this is just the beginning. Whether that beginning ends with American or Chinese technology setting the standard for counter-drone systems worldwide is a competition that is very much in progress — and one where the United States is currently behind.