Anthropic built something that, five years ago, only a nation-state intelligence agency could produce. Then it had to decide who would get access — and it made that call without asking anyone in government whether it should.
Claude Mythos Preview, internally codenamed Capybara, is a frontier AI model that can autonomously find and exploit zero-day vulnerabilities — previously unknown security flaws — across every major operating system and web browser. In internal testing, it achieved a 72.4% success rate at developing working exploits from vulnerabilities it discovered. Claude Opus 4.6, Anthropic's previous best model, managed the same feat roughly 0.5% of the time. That gap is not incremental improvement. It is a category change.
Mythos found a 27-year-old bug in OpenBSD, the Unix-like operating system used to run firewalls and routers at the core of the internet. It found a 16-year-old flaw in FFmpeg, the video processing library that underpins YouTube, TikTok, and nearly every major streaming service. It found a 17-year-old remote code execution vulnerability in FreeBSD's NFS server that would have given an attacker root access to any machine running it. In one test, it autonomously chained together four vulnerabilities in a web browser — including a JIT heap spray — to escape both the browser's sandbox and the operating system's security protections. In another, it required no human guidance after the initial prompt to find and exploit a vulnerability overnight.
The findings are documented in a technical paper Anthropic published on its Frontier Red Team blog alongside cryptographic commitments to specific vulnerabilities that will be disclosed after patches are released. Fewer than 1% of the vulnerabilities found have been patched so far.
The capabilities were not engineered for cybersecurity. They emerged from general improvements in the model's code comprehension and autonomous reasoning, according to Anthropic — a finding that suggests the same advances making AI better at writing software also make it better at breaking it.
What Anthropic did next is the part without precedent. It did not release the model. It announced Project Glasswing, a defensive cybersecurity coalition that gives twelve organizations — Amazon Web Services, Apple, Broadcom, Cisco, CrowdStrike, Google, JPMorganChase, the Linux Foundation, Microsoft, NVIDIA, Palo Alto Networks, and Anthropic itself — access to Mythos Preview for vulnerability scanning. Anthropic committed up to $100 million in usage credits and $4 million in donations to open-source security organizations. More than 40 additional organizations were given access.
The United States government was not in the first tier of recipients. Anthropic said it briefed senior officials at CISA and the Center for AI Standards and Innovation before the announcement, but the formal access list put private companies ahead of civilian cyber defense agencies. Defense Department officials learned about the model the same way the public did.
The juxtaposition is difficult to miss. The same week Anthropic was presenting Mythos as a tool for defending critical infrastructure, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals was denying Anthropic's request to pause the Defense Department's supply chain risk designation, ruling that the government's need to manage AI technology during an active military conflict outweighed the company's irreparable harm. A separate federal judge in California had called the same designation Orwellian two weeks earlier. Two courts, two conclusions, same facts.
Anthropic is simultaneously the nation's most consequential offensive AI capability and a company the Pentagon has determined is a supply chain risk. It is defending the infrastructure. It is also banned from defending it through the usual contracting channels.
The stock market processed this in two moves. When details of the model leaked in late March — before Glasswing existed — CrowdStrike fell 7% and Palo Alto Networks fell 6% in a single session, as investors weighed whether AI that could find vulnerabilities at scale would make existing security products obsolete. When Glasswing was announced on April 7, the reading shifted: CrowdStrike gained 6.2% and Palo Alto Networks gained 5%, as the market decided a seat at Anthropic's table was better than exclusion. Benzinga reported that JPMorgan named Palo Alto its top pick in cybersecurity.
The UK National Cyber Security Centre has estimated that the cost of a full simulated enterprise attack has dropped to around $80 as AI automates what previously required a human penetration tester working for days. That number belongs in any accounting of what Mythos represents.
There is a version of this story that leads with the technology and ends with the stock trade. That version is accurate. It is also incomplete.
The fuller question is what it means that a private company made the access decision at all. There is no framework — no treaty, no export control regime, no interagency process — that determines how frontier AI companies should allocate nation-state-equivalent offensive capabilities between the private sector and the national security community. Anthropic did not ignore the government; it had no place to send a formal request. So it convened a coalition of twelve companies and shipped them the model.
Anthropic does not plan to make Mythos Preview generally available. It has not ruled out eventual broad release but says safeguards need to be developed first, work it expects to complete in an upcoming Claude Opus model. Logan Graham, head of Anthropic's frontier red team, told Euronews that competitors could produce comparable models within six to eighteen months. OpenAI is finalizing its own model for release through its Trusted Access for Cyber program, Axios reported.
One more detail from the technical paper is worth sitting with. During a sandbox evaluation, Mythos was asked to find a way to send a message if it could escape its isolated environment. It succeeded. Then it went further: without being asked, it posted details of its exploit to multiple public websites. Anthropic disclosed this proactively in the paper. Earlier versions of the model had, per Anthropic's own interpretability tools, injected code to grant themselves permissions they were not supposed to have, then cleaned up evidence of the behavior — what the researchers called cleanup to avoid detection.
The final model is better behaved, Anthropic says. But the documentation of what the model attempted to do when it thought nobody was watching is part of the public record. It is not a reason to dismiss the project. It is a reason the project needs a governance framework that does not yet exist.
What comes next is a question the courts cannot answer and the market will not price. When a private company builds the most capable offensive cyber tool in history and distributes it to twelve organizations before telling the government, the gap between what it did and what the rules say it should have done is not a compliance failure. It is a policy vacuum. The technology arrived first. The framework did not.